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Abstract. In this paper, we consider two drawbacks of Cayrol and Lagasque-
Schiex’s meta-argumentation theory to model bipolar argumentation frameworks.
We consider first the “lost of admissibility” in Dung’s sense and second, the defini-
tion of notions of attack in the context of a support relation. We show how to prevent
these drawbacks by introducing support meta-arguments. Like the model of Cayrol
and Lagasque-Schiex, our formalization confirms the use of meta-argumentation
to reuse Dung’s properties. We do not take a stance towards the usefulness of a
support relation among arguments, though we show that if one would like to in-
troduce them, it can be done without extending Dung’s theory. Finally, we show
how to use meta-argumentation to instantiate an argumentation framework to rep-
resent defeasible support. In this model of support, the support relation itself can
be attacked.
Keywords. Abstract argumentation theory, bipolar argumentation, meta argumentation,
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1. Introduction
Cayrol and Lagasque-Schiex [8] discuss the following drawback of their meta-argu-
mentation theory for bipolar argumentation, which we aim to solve in this paper. The
bipolar argumentation framework BAF = 〈A,→,⇒〉 visualized in Figure 1.a has ––us-
ing their semantics––the extension of acceptable arguments {d, e}, whereas {d, e} is not
an admissible extension of the argumentation frameworkAF = 〈A,→〉, i.e. if we do not












Figure 1. (a) BAF = 〈A,→,⇒〉, with arguments A = {a, b, c, d, e}, attack relation {b→ d, e→ c} and
support relation {a⇒ b, b⇒ c}. (b) The BAF of Figure 1.a. in our meta-argumentation framework.
The extension {d, e} would not be admissible in Dung’s setting, because there is no
argument in the extension {d, e} attacking argument b, whereas b attacks argument d.
However, a bipolar argumentation framework extends Dung’s abstract argumentation
framework with a second binary relation ⇒ among arguments, representing support
among arguments, and in the theory of Cayrol and Lagasque-Schiex [8], this makes the
extension {d, e} admissible. In this paper we address the following research question:
• How to analyze and prevent Cayrol and Lagasque-Schiex drawback where exten-
sions can be inadmissible for the Dung’s framework without support?
In this paper, we distinguish between deductive support, which means that argument a
supports argument b if the acceptance of a implies the acceptance of b, and defeasible
support, which means that the implication holds only by default and it can be attacked.
Our research question therefore breaks down in the following sub-questions:
1. Why do they [8] run into the loss of Dung’s admissibility drawback?
2. How can we solve this drawback if we consider deductive support only?
3. How can we extend deductive support to defeasible support?
Cayrol and Lagasque-Schiex [8], as explained in more detail in Section 2, run
into this drawback, because they turn a bipolar argumentation framework into a “col-
lective” meta-argumentation framework in which meta-arguments represent sets of ar-
guments called coalitions. Their meta-argumentation framework is introduced to reuse
Dung’s principles, properties and algorithms, and to solve problems in their earlier ap-
proaches [7,1]. Moreover, their approach has an additional drawback. Suppose that Liv-
erpool wins Premier League (lpl) if it wins the last match (wlm) or Manchester does not
win its own one (mnw). We have two implications: “Liverpool wins last match” sup-
ports “Liverpool wins Premier League”, (wlm ⇒ lpl), and “Manchester does not win
last match” supports “Liverpool wins Premier League”, (mnw ⇒ lpl). If an argument a
attacks “Liverpool wins last match” (a→ wlm) then it attacks also “Liverpool wins Pre-
mier League”. This is counterintuitive because lpl is supported also by argument mnw.
This kind of attack has the form “if a ⇒ b and c → a then c → b” and it is called
secondary attack [8].
Our approach also uses meta-argumentation and therefore also reuses Dung’s princi-
ples, algorithms and properties [5,3]. However, we represent the deductive support of ar-
gument a to argument b by the attack of argument b to an auxiliary argument called Za,b,
together with the attack of argument Za,b to argument a. Instead of secondary attacks,
we introduce mediated attacks representing the following constraint: if a⇒ b and c→ b
then a mediated attack c→ a is added. As visualized in Figure 1.b the set of acceptable
arguments {d, e} is admissible because given that b → d, e defends d against b with a
mediated attack e 99K b and {d, e} is stable because a /∈ {d, e} and argument e ∈ {d, e}
attacks a with the mediated attack e 99K a, due to the mediated attack e 99K b. So the
set of acceptable arguments {d, e} is admissible in Dung’s sense in our model thanks to
these mediated attack and the absence of “collective” meta-arguments.
Moreover, given a bipolar argumentation framework, we introduce second-order at-
tacks to model defeasible support. These attacks can be of two kinds: attacks from an
argument or an attack relation to another attack relation and attacks from an argument to
a support relation. Attacks on support lead to an override of the constraints for deductive
support described above.
The layout of this paper follows the three research questions and is as follows. Sec-
tion 2 presents the existing bipolar argumentation frameworks [8]. In Section 3, we pro-
pose the representation of deductive support using meta-argumentation. Section 4 intro-
duces defeasible support and second-order attacks. Conclusions end the paper.
2. Cayrol and Lagasquie-Schiex’s bipolar argumentation framework
In this section we summarize the definitions of bipolar argumentation frameworks with
the terminology used by Cayrol and Lagasquie-Schiex [8].
Definition 1 (Bipolar Argumentation Framework BAF [8]) A bipolar argumentation
framework 〈A,→,⇒〉 consists of a finite setA called arguments and two binary relations
on A called attack and support respectively.
The purpose of Cayrol and Lagasquie-Schiex [8] is to define a meta-argumentation
framework, consisting only of a set of meta-arguments and a conflict relation between
these meta-arguments. Their idea is that a meta-argument makes sense if its members are
somehow related by the support relation [8].
Definition 2 (Conflict free) Given an argumentation framework AF = 〈A,→〉, a set
C ⊆ A is conflict free, denoted as cf(C), iff there do not exist α, β ∈ C such that α→ β.
Meta-arguments are called elementary coalitions in [8] and are defined as follows:
Definition 3 (Elementary coalitions [8]) An elementary coalition of BAF is a subset
EC = {a1, . . . , an} of A such that
1. there exists a permutation {i1, . . . , in} of {1, . . . , n} such that the sequence of
support ai1 ⇒ ai2 , . . . ,⇒ ain holds;
2. cf(EC);
3. EC is maximal (with respect to⊆) among the subsets of A satisfying (1) and (2).
EC denotes the set of elementary coalitions of BAF and
ECAF = 〈EC(A), c-attacks 〉 is the elementary coalition framework associated with
BAF . Cayrol and Lagasquie-Schiex [8] define a conflict relation on EC(A) as follows:
Definition 4 (c-attacks relation [8]) Let EC1 and EC2 be two elementary coalitions of
BAF . EC1 c-attacks EC2 if and only if there exists an argument a1 in EC1 and an
argument a2 in EC2 such that a1 → a2.
Definition 5 (Acceptability semantics [8])
• S is a ecp-extension of BAF if and only if there exists {EC1, . . . , ECp} a pre-
ferred extension of ECAF such that S = EC1 ∪ . . . ∪ ECp.
• S is a ecs-extension of BAF if and only if there exists {EC1, . . . , ECp} a stable
extension of ECAF such that S = EC1 ∪ . . . ∪ ECp.
• S is a ecg-extension of BAF if and only if there exists {EC1, . . . , ECp} a
grounded extension of ECAF such that S = EC1 ∪ . . . ∪ ECp.
Definition 5 provides preferred, stable and grounded extensions, but it can be de-
fined more generally for any semantics defined on Dung’s argumentation framework. In
general, there is a function g that defines extensions of extended argumentation frame-
works in terms of extensions of meta-arguments. In Definition 5, the extensions of ar-
guments are obtained by taking the union of the extensions of meta-arguments. So a
BAF = 〈A,⇒,→〉 is flattened to a framework AF = 〈MA, 7−→〉 where MA is the set
called meta arguments and 7−→ is a binary relation on meta-arguments called meta-attack
relation. In this way, Definition 5 becomes: E(BAF ) = {EEC1 ∪ . . . ∪ EECp |EECi ∈
E(AF )} where E(AF ) : 2U × 2U×U → 22U is Dung’s acceptance function. For exam-
ple, if E(AF ) = {{{a, b}, {c}}, {{d, e}}} then E(BAF ) = {{a, b, c}, {d, e}}. As we
discuss in the following section, in our meta argumentation theory we do not take the
union, but we filter away auxiliary arguments like the arguments Za,b in Figure 1.b.
Given bipolar argumentation frameworks, Cayrol and Lagasquie-Schiex [8] define
supported and secondary attacks based on attack and support as shown in Figure 2.a-b.
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Figure 2. The three attack relations based on attack and support defined for bipolar argumentation frameworks.
This figure should be read as follows. If there is a support of argument a to argu-
ment b and there is an attack from argument b to argument c, then [8] claim that there
is a supported attack from a to c. If there is an attack from a to b and b supports c,
then Cayrol and Lagasquie-Schiex [8] claim that there is a secondary attack from a to c.
Supported and secondary attacks are defined for a sequence of support relations and an
attack relation, e.g., in Figure 2.a there may be d⇒ e, e⇒ a in addition to a⇒ b.
The drawback of the meta-argumentation proposed by [8] is, as they call it, the loss
of admissibility in Dung’s sense. The authors of [8] claim also that this loss of admissibil-
ity is neither surprising nor really problematic for them. They motivate this claim observ-
ing that admissibility is lost because it takes into account “individual” attack whereas,
with their meta-argumentation, they want to consider “collective” attack. First we under-
line that the aim of using meta-argumentation is to preserve all Dung’s properties and
principles and second we do not agree that meta-arguments make sense if their members
are somehow related by the support relation, as assumed by [8]. In this paper we prevent
this drawback by using our meta-argumentation methodology and adding a new kind of
attack called mediated attacks. Let us consider again the example of Figure 1. Given this
BAF and the mediated attacks we add in our model, the extension {d, e} becomes an
admissible extension also for the corresponding Dung’s argumentation framework where
the support relation is not considered.
A further drawback of the approach presented in [8] is, as described by the foot-
ball example in the introduction, that secondary attacks lead to inconsistencies, i.e., if
the argument “Liverpool wins last match” is attacked then this does not mean that ar-
gument “Liverpool wins Premier League” is attacked too since it is supported also by
another argument, “Manchester does not win last match”. We avoid the introduction of
this kind of attack called secondary attacks in [8]. For a further discussion about bipolar
argumentation frameworks, see [7,1,8].
3. Modelling deductive support
In this section, we present how to model deductive support in meta-argumentation. How
to model support in argumentation is a controversial issue. There is no a single notion
of “support”, as witnessed by Toulmin [12] where support is a relation between data and
claims, but it may be expected that there are many, which can be used in different ap-
plications. However, in Dung’s framework of abstract argumentation [9], support could
also be represented by Dung’s notion of defence [9], or by instantiating abstract argu-
ments [11]. The aim of this paper is not to take a position in this debate but to provide a
new way to model support in bipolar argumentation frameworks. We introduce notions
as deductive support and defeasible support which are different from Cayrol et al. [7,1,8].
Moreover, we introduce a methodology which makes it possible to define various kinds
of support in a relatively easy way without the need to introduce additional machinery.
We want deductive support to satisfy the following conditions on the acceptability
of supported arguments: if argument a supports argument b, and a is acceptable, then b
must be acceptable too, and if argument a supports argument b, and b is not acceptable,
then a must be not acceptable either. Moreover, the extensions must be admissible, if the
acceptance function of the basic argumentation framework is admissible too.
We illustrate the difference between the meta-argumentation used by Cayrol and
Lagasquie-Schiex [8] and the one we introduce in this paper, using an example. Consider
the bipolar argumentation framework in Figure 3.1, where argument d supports argu-














Figure 3. An example of bipolar argumentation framework.
According to Cayrol and Lagasquie-Schiex [8], the intuitive extension of this bipolar
argumentation framework is the extension {b, e}. They obtain this extension in two steps.
First, they define meta-arguments as sets of arguments, and define meta-attack relations
as attacks between sets of arguments. As illustrated in Figure 3.2, this means that the
meta-argument {d, c} attacks argument b.
In our meta-argumentation methodology, we do not group arguments together in
meta-arguments, but we add meta-arguments. As illustrated in Figure 3.3, we add
meta-arguments Xx,y and Yx,y for each attack of argument x to argument y. Meta-
argumentXx,y is read as “the attack from x to y is not active” and meta-argument Yx,y is
read as “the attack from x to y is active”. Moreover, we introduce a meta-argument Zd,c
and if argument d supports argument c, then we add the attack relations from acc(c)
to Zd,c, and from Zd,c to acc(d). Meta-argument Zd,c is read as “argument d does not
support argument c”.
We [5,3] instantiate Dung’s theory with meta-arguments, such that we use Dung’s
theory to reason about itself. Meta-argumentation is a particular way to define map-
pings from argumentation frameworks to extended argumentation frameworks: argu-
ments are interpreted as meta-arguments, of which some are mapped to “argument a
is accepted”, acc(a), where a is an abstract argument from the extended argumentation
framework EAF . The meta-argumentation methodology is summarized in Figure 4.
We use a so-called acceptance function E mapping a bipolar argumentation frame-
work 〈A,→,⇒〉 to its set of extensions, i.e., to a set of sets of arguments, where the
universe of arguments U is the set of all generated arguments.
Figure 4. The meta-argumentation methodology.
Definition 6 Let U be a set called the universe of arguments. An acceptance function
EBAF : 2U × 2U×U × 2U×U → 22U is a partial function defined for each bipolar
argumentation framework 〈A,→,⇒〉 with finiteA ⊆ U and→⊆ A×A and⇒⊆ A×A,
and mapping a bipolar argumentation framework 〈A,→,⇒〉 to sets of subsets of A:
EBAF (〈A,→,⇒〉) ⊆ 2A.
The function f assigns to each argument a in the EAF , an argument “argument a
is accepted” in the basic argumentation framework. We use Dung’s acceptance function
E : 2U × 2U×U → 22U to find functions E ′ between extended argumentation frame-
works EAF and the acceptable arguments AA′ they return. The accepted arguments of
the argumentation framework are a function of the extended argumentation framework
AA = E ′(EAF ). The transformation function consists of two parts: a function f−1
transforms an argumentation framework AF to an extended argumentation framework
EAF , and a function g transforms the acceptable arguments of the basic AF into ac-
ceptable arguments of the EAF . Summarizing E ′ = {(f−1(a), g(b)) | (a, b) ∈ E} and
AA′ = E ′(EAF ) = g(AA) = g(E(AF )) = g(E(f(EAF ))).
The first step of our approach is to define the set of extended argumentation frame-
works. The second step consists in defining flattening algorithms as a function from this
set of EAF s to the set of all basic argumentation frameworks: f : EAF → AF .
As in [8], we generalize the key concept of attack between two arguments by com-
bining a sequence of support relations and a direct attack relation. If there is a support of
argument a to argument b and there is an attack from argument c to argument b, then we
claim that there is a mediated attack from c to a. Mediated attacks are defined as follows:
Definition 7 (Mediated attacks) Let a, b ∈ A, a mediated attack for b by a is a se-
quence a1R1 . . . Rn−2an−1 and anRn−1an−1, n > 3, with a1 = b, an = a, such that
Rn−1 =→ and ∀i = 1 . . . n-2, Ri =⇒.
Mediated attacks are illustrated in Figure 2.
Example 1 Let BAF1 be defined by arguments A = {a, b, c, d, e}, support relation
{d ⇒ c} and attack relation {b → a, c → b, e → c} as shown in Figure 5.a. BAF1
has one supported attack, because given d ⇒ c → b we add d 99K b and one mediated
attack, because given d ⇒ c and e → c we add e 99K d where 99K are supported and
mediated attacks. The set of acceptable arguments is {e, b} and this is the only preferred,
grounded and stable extension.
Example 2 Let BAF2 be defined by arguments A = {a, b, c, d, e}, support relation
{c ⇒ b, c ⇒ d} and attack relation {a→ b, d→ e} as shown in Figure 5.b. We have
two new attacks according to Definition 7: a 99K c is a mediated attack and c 99K e





Figure 5. (a) BAF1 and (b) BAF2, with the supported and mediated attacks.
grounded {a, d}, as for the associate Dung’s AF, while the preferred, grounded and
stable extensions of [8] for BAF2 is {a, e}. This is because, first, the mediated attack
a 99K c is not considered, [8] claim there is no attack of an element of the set {a, e}
against c. Introducing explicitly mediated attacks allows us to preserve admissibility in
Dung’s sense. Second, in [8], b, c, d are considered as a meta-argument thus acceptable
only as a whole.
Definition 8 presents the instantiation of a basic argumentation framework as a bipo-
lar argumentation framework using meta-argumentation. This allows us to have not only
that arguments can support other arguments but also that arguments can support attack
relations and that attack relations can support other attack relations. In this way we do
not restrict the support relation of being only between arguments but also between binary
relations themselves.
The flattening of the support relations can be summarized in the following way.
Given a support relation a ⇒ b, it holds that if argument b is not acceptable then argu-
ment a is not acceptable either and if argument a is acceptable then argument b is accept-
able too. The universe of meta-arguments is
MU = {acc(a) | a ∈ U} ∪ {Xa,b, Ya,b | a, b ∈ U} ∪ {Za,b | a, b ∈ U}, and
the flattening function f is given by f(EAF ) = 〈MA, 7−→〉 where MA is the set
called meta-arguments and 7−→ is a binary relation called meta-attack. For a set of argu-
ments B ⊆MU , the unflattening function g is given by g(B) = {a | acc(a) ∈ B}, and
for sets of arguments AA ⊆ 2MU , it is given by g(AA) = {g(B) | B ∈ AA}.
Definition 8 Given a bipolar argumentation framework BAF = 〈A,→,⇒〉, the set of
meta-arguments MA ⊆ MU is {acc(a) | a ∈ A} ∪ {Xa,b, Ya,b | a, b ∈ A} ∪ {Za,b |
a, b ∈ A} and 7−→⊆MA×MA is a binary relation on MA such that:
acc(a) 7−→ Xa,b iff a→ b ∧ Xa,b 7−→ Ya,b iff a→ b ∧ Ya,b 7−→ acc(b) iff a→ b,
acc(b) 7−→ Za,b iff a⇒ b ∧ Za,b 7−→ acc(a) iff a⇒ b.
For a given flattening function f , the acceptance function of the extended argumen-
tation theory E ′ is defined using the acceptance function of the basic abstract argumenta-
tion theory E : an argument of an EAF is acceptable if and only if it is acceptable in the
flattened basic AF .
The following propositions hold for our meta-argumentation with supported and
mediated attacks.
Proposition 1 (Conflict free for supported and mediated attacks) Given a bipolar
argumentation framework BAF , if there is a supported or mediated attack from a to b,
and a is acceptable, then b is not acceptable.
Proof: We prove the contrapositive. If there is a supported or mediated attack from a to
b, and b is acceptable, then a is not acceptable. So assume that there is a supported or
mediated attack from a to b, and acc(b) is acceptable. Then meta-argument Ya,b is not
acceptable and Xa,b is acceptable. Consequently, acc(a) is not acceptable.
Proposition 2 (Semantics of support) Given a bipolar argumentation framework
BAF , if it holds that a⇒ b and argument a is acceptable, a ∈ E(BAF ), then argument
b is acceptable too.
Proof: We prove the contrapositive. If it holds that a⇒ b and argument b is not accept-
able, then argument a is not acceptable. Assume that a ⇒ b and meta-argument acc(b)
is not accepted, then meta-argument Za,b is acceptable. Consequently, meta-argument
acc(a) is not acceptable.
Proposition 3 Given a bipolar argumentation framework BAF , if we add a supported
attack such that a→ c if a⇒ b and b→ c, then the extensions do not change, using our
meta-argumentation and one of Dung’s semantics.
Proof: We use reasoning by cases. Case 1: acc(a) is acceptable, then also acc(b) is
acceptable following Proposition 2, and given b → c, a → c can be deleted without
changing the extension. Case 2: acc(a) is not acceptable, then a → c can be deleted.
Case 3: acc(a) is undecided, then also acc(b) is undecided and acc(c) is undecided.
It may be argued that our representation of deductive support is in contrast with
other interpretations of support. Specifically, the fact that a supports b is modeled by the
flattening function with a path from acc(b) to acc(a), i.e. acc(a) is acceptable only if
acc(b) is acceptable. It does not correspond to the other view of support from a to b, i.e.
the acceptance of b yield the acceptance of a and not vice versa.
Note that, given a ⇒ b, in meta-argumentation we condense all the attacks which
are both on b and thus on a (both from b and thus from a) using only meta-argument
Za,b, see Proposition 4. This means that the closure rules do not change the extensions
of the meta-argumentation framework. In this way we simplify the representation of the
meta-argumentation framework in which supported and mediated attacks occur.
Proposition 4 Given a bipolar argumentation framework BAF in our meta-argumentation
where a⇒ b and c→ b and there is a mediated attack c→ a, if Yc,a is acceptable then
Za,b and Yc,b are acceptable too.
Proof: We prove the contrapositive. If it holds that Za,b and Yc,b are not acceptable
then Yc,a is not acceptable. Assume that acc(c) is not acceptable, so Xc,b and Xc,a are
acceptable and Yc,b and Za,b are not acceptable. Consequently, Yc,a is not acceptable.
Example 3 Let BAF3 be defined by A = {a, b, c}, {a⇒ b}, {b→ c} and BAF4 be de-
fined byA = {a, b, c}, {a⇒ b}, {c→ b}. The instantiation of a classical argumentation
framework as BAF3 and BAF4 is described in Figure 6.
The sets of meta-arguments are MA3 = {acc(a), acc(b), acc(c), Xb,c, Yb,c, Za,b} and
MA4 = {acc(a), acc(b), acc(c), Xc,b, Yc,b, Za,b}. In BAF3, we have that the set
of meta-attack relations is composed by acc(b) 7−→ Xb,c 7−→ Yb,c 7−→ acc(c)
acc(a) acc(b)Za,b Xb,c acc(c)Yb,c





Figure 6. Turning BAF3 and BAF4 into meta-argumentation.
and by the support relation acc(b) 7−→ Za,b 7−→ acc(a). The same happens for
BAF4 where we have acc(c) 7−→ Xc,b 7−→ Yc,b 7−→ acc(b) and the support
relation acc(b) 7−→ Za,b 7−→ acc(a). The set of acceptable arguments for each
BAF is represented by the grey arguments. We have that E ′(BAF3) = {a, b} and
E ′(BAF4) = {c} are the acceptable arguments. The sets of acceptable arguments for
the meta-argumentation frameworks are E(f(BAF3)) = {acc(a), acc(b), Yb,c} and
E(f(BAF4)) = {acc(c), Za,b, Yc,b} and by filtering these sets we obtain the same ac-
ceptable arguments of the starting BAF s, E ′(BAF3) = g(E(f(BAF3))) = {a, b} and
E ′(BAF4) = g(E(f(BAF4))) = {c}. Meta-argument Za,b represents in a compact way
that every attack from b to an argument c leads to an attack from a to c (BAF3) and that
every attack to b from an argument c leads to an attack from c to a (BAF4).
Example 4 Let BAF5 be defined by A = {a, b, c, d}, {a⇒ b, b⇒ c, a⇒ d}, {d→ c}
as in Figure 7. The set of acceptable arguments is {d} as for the associated Dung’s
argumentation framework. In bipolar argumentation [8], the set of acceptable arguments





Figure 7. Turning BAF5 into meta-argumentation.
Our approach allows us to reuse all the principles, algorithms and properties defined
for standard Dung’s argumentation framework without loosing admissibility in Dung’s
sense. Using our meta-argumentation admissibility is not lost because we take into ac-
count individual attacks and defence while Cayrol and Lagasquie-Schiex [8] consider
“collective” attacks and defence for coalitions. A recent approach to represent support
in argumentation has been proposed by Brewka and Woltran [6]. In this paper they in-
troduce a generalization of Dung-style argumentation where each node comes with an
associated acceptance condition.This allows to model different types of dependencies,
e.g. support and attack, within a single framework. Given that a⇒ b, they represent sup-
port as acc(a) 7−→ Za,b 7−→ b without posing constraints as we do. We can extend our
meta-argumentation to consider also this model of support but it is not evident how the
approach of [6] can be extended in order to introduce our constraints and second-order
attacks.
4. Modelling defeasible support
In this section, we define defeasible support. We highlight two possible kinds of second-
order attacks and we present how to instantiate Dung’s AF with an extended argumen-
tation framework with support relations and second-order attack relations.
The two kinds of second-order attacks are, first, attacks from an argument or an at-
tack relation to another attack relation and second, attacks from an argument to a sup-
port relation. The first kind of second-order attack has received a lot of attention in the
last years and similar proposals using a meta approach have been proposed [10,4,2]. The
difference is that we are able to treat also the case in which an attack relation attacks
another attack relation. Concerning the second kind of second-order attacks, it has not
been considered yet in the context of bipolar argumentation frameworks. Definition 9
presents the instantiation of a basic argumentation framework as a bipolar second-order
argumentation framework using meta-argumentation. The flattening function f is as in
Definition 8.
Definition 9 Given an extended argumentation framework EAF = 〈A,→,⇒,→2〉
where A ⊆ U is a set of arguments, →⊆ A × A, ⇒⊆ A × A and →2 is a bi-
nary relation on (A∪ →) × (→ ∪ ⇒), the set of meta-arguments MA ⊆ MU is
{acc(a) | a ∈ A} ∪ {Xa,b, Ya,b | a, b ∈ A} ∪ {Za,b | a, b ∈ A} ∪ {Xa,b→c, Ya,b→c |
a, b, c ∈ A} and 7−→⊆MA×MA is a binary relation on MA such that:
acc(a) 7−→ Xa,b iff a→ b ∧ Xa,b 7−→ Ya,b iff a→ b ∧ Ya,b 7−→ acc(b) iff a→ b,
acc(b) 7−→ Za,b iff a⇒ b ∧ Za,b 7−→ acc(a) iff a⇒ b,
acc(a) 7−→ Xa,b→c iff a →2 (b → c) ∧ Xa,b→c 7−→ Ya,b→c iff a →2 (b → c)
∧ Ya,b→c 7−→ Yb,c iff a→2 (b→ c),
Ya,b 7−→ Yc,d iff (a→ b)→2 (c→ d),
acc(c) 7−→ Xc,Za,b iff c →2 (a ⇒ b) ∧ Xc,Za,b 7−→ Yc,Za,b iff c →2 (a ⇒ b)
∧ Yc,Za,b 7−→ Za,b iff c→2 (a⇒ b).
Example 6 LetBAF3 be extended with the second-order attack relation {d→ (b→ c)},
as in Figure 8.1. The set of acceptable arguments is {a, b, c, d} since the attack from b
to c is made ineffective by argument d. Let BAF4 be extended with the second-order
attack relation {d → (c → b))}, as in Figure 8.2. The set of acceptable arguments is
again {a, b, c, d}. Note that since b is no more attacked and can be accepted, also a can
be accepted in this example.
acc(a) acc(b)Za,b Xb,c acc(c)Yb,c acc(a) acc(b)Za,b Yc,b acc(c)Xc,b
Yd, b→cacc(d) Xd, b→c Yd, b→c acc(d)Xd, b→c
(1) (2)
Figure 8. BAF3 and BAF4 with second-order attacks.
What does it mean that the support relation between two arguments does not hold
anymore? It means that, given a⇒ b, when b is not acceptable, a can be acceptable and
converse when a is acceptable than b can be not acceptable.
Example 7 LetBAF3 be extended with the second-order attack relation {d→ (a⇒ b))},
as in Figure 9.1. The set of acceptable arguments is {a, b, d}. LetBAF4 be extended with
the second-order attack relation {d→ (a⇒ b))}, as in Figure 9.2. The set of acceptable
arguments is {a, c, d}. Note that b is attacked by argument c and it is not acceptable but
a is acceptable because the support relation has been made ineffective by the attack of d.
acc(a) acc(b)Za,b Xb,c acc(c)Yb,c acc(a) acc(b)Za,b Yc,b acc(c)Xc,b
Yd, Za,b acc(d)Xd, Za,b Yd, Za,b acc(d)Xd, Za,b
(1) (2)
Figure 9. BAF3 and BAF4 with an attack on the support relation.
Our model of defeasible support allows us to represent both rebut and undercut in
meta-argumentation. Rebut is modeled when a ⇒ b and c → b, as discussed in the
previous section, while undercut is modeled when c → (a ⇒ b) so when the support
relation itself is attacked. Let us consider the following example: the fact that Tweety is
a bird (tb) provides support for its flying ability (tf ). Then it turns out that Tweety is a
pinguin (tp). Argument “Tweety flies” is attacked by “Tweety is a pinguin”, tp → tf .
Following our constraints, does it mean that Tweety is not a bird? No, we have that
argument tp attacks both the argument tf but also the fact that being a bird supports the
flying ability of Tweety, tp→ (tb⇒ tf).
5. Conclusions and Future Work
Table 1 summarizes the comparison between Cayrol and Lagasquie-Schiex’s [8] ap-
proach and our one.
Table 1. Comparison between Cayrol and Lagasquie-Schiex [8] and our approach
Their meta-argumentation Our meta-argumentation
Additional attacks supported, secondary supported, mediated
Meta-arguments sets of arguments additional meta-arguments
Function g union of meta-arguments filtering meta-arguments
Admissibility in Dung’s sense no yes
Attacks on support relation no yes
We can prevent the drawbacks of [8] by considering deductive support where given
a ⇒ b it holds that: if a is acceptable then b is acceptable too and if b is not acceptable
then a is not acceptable either. Moreover, we consider that if a ⇒ b and c → b then
the mediated attack c → a is added. These attacks substitute [8]’s secondary attacks.
Secondary attacks lead to inconsistencies, i.e., when it is the case that an argument is
supported by two different arguments. If one of the two supporter arguments is attacked
then also the supported argument is attacked even if it is supported also by the another
unattacked argument. Moreover, mediated attacks avoid the “loss of admissibility” as
shown by the examples of Section 3.
We extend deductive support to defeasible support by allowing second-order attacks
not only on attack relations but also on support relations. Given a⇒ b and a second-order
attack on this support relation c → (a ⇒ b), we have that the semantics of deductive
support does not hold anymore. In [8], no attacks to the support relations are introduced
and it is not clear how it could be done with their “collective” meta-arguments.
Due to the modelling perspective, we have to observe that there is no a single notion
of “support”, but there are many, which can be used in different applications. We intro-
duce notions which are different from [8] and [6]. Moreover, we introduce a method-
ology which makes it possible to define various kinds of support in a relatively easy
way, without the need to introduce additional machinery. Since there are various kinds
of support, it is better not to extend argumentation frameworks, but to instantiate them.
A topic for future research is how to model attacks and support with strengths. For
example we may say that if there is an attack and a support with the same strength on
argument a, then argument a is undecided. A way of representing strengths consists in
having, instead of X and Y attack arguments, arguments X1, Y1, X2, Y2 and so on.
Likewise we can have Z1, Z2, Z3and so on for support relations, and we have that Yi
attacks Zj if i > j and Zi attacks Yj if i > j. As observed above, there are various kinds
of support, so it is better to instantiate argumentation frameworks. In that way, we can
add new notions of support under the form of patters. The definition of the patterns for
deductive support and defeasible support is left for further research.
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